STATE v. RYAN.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
STATE v. RYAN.
A statute providing that "any person charged * ** with being an inebriate, habitual or common drunkard, shall be arrested and brought before a
Judge of a Court of Record for trial; * * * and if convicted * * * shall be
sentenced to confinement in any inebriate or insane asylum in this State; * * *
provided that some relative or friend * * * shall execute a bond conditioned
that he will pay for the support of such inebriate * * * during his confinement," is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, Amend., Art.
14, § 1, which declares that no State shall "deprive any person of * * *
liberty, * * * without due process of law ;" nor "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
ORIGINAL

proceeding by certiorari.

Austin, Runkel & Austin, for relator.
Jenkins, Winkler & Smith, for respondent.
February 28, 1888.
CASSODAY, J.
The relator's right to a discharge depends
upon the validity of chapter 194, Laws of 1887, under which
he was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to confinement for the period of two years. This Act is certainly anomalous. It is entitled "An Act relating to inebriates and
habitual drunkards." The language of the Act, however,
leaves it somewhat doubtful whether it should be regarded as
penal or paternal. If it is to be regarded as penal, then its
validity would seem to turn on widely different considerations
than if it were paternal ; and if it is to be regarded as paternal, then its validity would seem to turn upon widely differ_
ent considerations than if it were penal. It reads: " Any
person who shall be charged upon the complaint of another
with being an inebriate, habitual or common drunkard, shall
be arrested and brought before a Judge of a Court of Record
for trial in the same manner that offenders may be arrested
and brought to trial before a justice of the peace; and if he
shall be convicted of being an inebriate, habitual or common
drunkard, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment or confinement in any inebriate or insane asylum in this State, for a
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period not exceeding two years, nor less than three months;
provided, however, that before such sentence some relative or
friend of such inebriate, habitual or common drunkard, shall
execute a bond in the sum of $1000, with sufficient surety, to
be approved by such Judge, to the State of Wisconsin, conditioned that he will pay for the support and treatment of such
inebriate, habitual or common drunkard, during his imprisonment and confinement."
1. Is it penal? and, if so, is it a valid enactment? The
words "charged," "arrested," "for trial," as "offenders,"
"convicted" and "sentenced to imprisonment or confinement"
"for a period" to be definitely fixed, would seem to indicate
an intention to make it a criminal offence to be "an inebriate,
habitual or common drunkard," under any and all circumstances. The police powers of the State are certainly not only
sweeping but potential when legitimately exercised. According to the more recent utterances of the Supreme Court of
the United States, even the late, Amendments to the Federal
Constitution were not "designed to interfere with the power
of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education
and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase
the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to
its wealth and prosperity :" Barbierv. Connolly, 118 U. S. 31,
per FiELD, J. This language was expressly sanctioned by Mr.
Justice HARLAN, speaking for the Court, in the very recent
case of uygler v. State, 123 U. S. 663. In a recent work on
the Limitations of Police Power, it is in effect asserted that
there can be no lawful punishment of mere drunkenness, so
long as it is concealed in strict privacy, without any exposure
to or interference with the public or any individual: Tied.
Lim.' Police Power, 302. In other words, that strictly private
and concealed vice of the individual cannot be lawfully made
a public offence. The language of the Act in question would
certainly admit of such conviction, without such exposure of
publicity. But we are not called upon to determine whether
the Act is invalid for that reason, unless we should conclude
that the Act must be regarded as a penal statute-a question
which will be presently determined. If to be "an inebriate,
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habitual or common drunkard" was intended to be made a
criminal offence by the Act, then it should have provided for
or recognized the right of a "public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district wherein the offence" should be
"committed: which county or district" should "have been
previously ascertained by law :" section 7, art. 1, Const. Wis.
The right to such "public trial" thus secured is manifestly a
trial by jury in a Court of Law, having jurisdiction by virtue
of law. The fact that no such trial is given, and no such jurisdiction is conferred or recognized in the Act in question
constrains us to believe that it never was designed, and if it
was, that it cannot be regarded as a valid penal statute. The
Act in substance provides that any person so charged "shall
be arrested and brought before a Judge of a Court of Record
for trial," and if convicted and the requisite bond given, "he
shall be sentenced," etc. We understand this to mean any
Judge of any Court of Record in the State, even at chambers.
True, this relator was so brought before the "Judge of the
Municipal Court of the City and County of Milwaukee, being
a Court of Record within said county." This is recited in
the commitment. So it is recited therein that the complaint
so charging the relator, was "addressed to" said Judge (naming and describing him) and that " upon said complaint,"
the said relator "was arrested and brought befbre the said"
Judge (again naming and describing him) "for trial," and
that "a trial of such charge" was "duly had before the said
Judge and a jury, as demanded by the said" relator; and that
"upon such trial, the said" relator "was convicted of being
an inebriate, habitual and common drunkard ;" and that upon
the bond being given, "the said" Judge (again naming and
describing him) "did, upon such conviction, * * * sentence
the said" relator "to confinement * * * for the period of two
years," etc. There is nothing in the commitment from which
it can be inferred that such Municipal Court took or assumed
to take jurisdiction of the matter so charged, nor that such
trial was in or by said Court. On the contrary it appears
throughout the commitment that the Judge of said Municipal Court acted as such Judge and only by reason of the authority supposed to be given to him as "a Judge of a Court of
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Record" by virtue of said Act. The same language applies
with equal force to a Judge of a County Court or a Circuit
Court, or even of this Court. And yet we apprehend that no
one would claim that the Legislature bad power to authorize
a member of this Court to take original jurisdiction in the
trial of a criminal offence. Nor could the Legislature lawfully authorize the trial of such criminal offence before and by
a Judge at chambers. And yet the Act gave to the Judge of
the Municipal Court, sitting merely as "a Judge of a Court of
Record," no other or greater powers than are therein given to
any Judge of any other Court of Record, and hence, at most, not
exceeding such powers as may be lawfully exercised by any
Judge of a Court of Record at chambers. If the Legislature
could lawfully authorize the trial of criminal offences by and
before such Judge at chambers, then it could effectually leave
the person so charged and convicted without any remedy by
writ of error, which is only authorized to review final judgments in actions triable by jury as a matter of right: Crocker
v. State, 60 Wis. 553. But the Constitution provides that in
such actions "writs of error shall never be prohibited by
law :" Id. section 21, art. I, Const. Wis. We must therefore
conclude that the Act was not designed to be a penal statute,
and that if it is one in fact, it must to that extent be regarded
as inoperative.
2. Is the Act in question paternal ? and if so, is it a valid
enactment? Upon the argument it seemed to be conceded on
both sides that the Act was designed wholly for the benefit
and good of such unfortunate persons as might be liable to
such charge. In fact the learned counsel in behalf of such
detention likened the Act to the early statute of NSew
York, which gave to the Court of Chancery custody and control of the person as well as the estate of an habitual drunkard: In re Lynch, 5 Paige, 120. It was there said that such
powers of the Court of Chancery were by such statute "put
precisely upon the same ground as its powers over the persons and estates of idiots and lunatics." In that case the
person in custody had been "found to be incapable of conducting his own affairs by reason of habitual drunkenness."
The Chancellor said: "Whenever the Court is satisfied she

STATE v. RYAN.

has so far reformed that there is no danger of a relapse, the
committee will be discharged and her estate will be restored
to her." It was thereupon ordered in conformity to the "decisions, subject, however, to be modified by the Vice-Chancellor from timeto time," as be might judge expedient, etc. Our
general statute provides in effect that "when any person, by
excessive drinking, shall be unable to attend to business, or
shall be lost to self-control, and shall thereby greatly endanger
his health, life, or property, or shall be an unsafe person to
remain at large, or shall by gaming, idleness, or debauchery
of any kind so spend, waste, or lessen his estate as to endanger
his own or his thmily's support, or expose the town to charge
or expense for such support," and the proper verified petition setting forth the facts and .circumstances of the case be
presented to and filed with the County Court; and if after
due notice and " a full hearing, it shall appear to the Court
proper under this section, such Court shall appoint a guardian of his person and estate with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. The County Court shall have power to authorize or direct the guardian of any such person named in
this section to commit such person to any inebriate asylum
* * * for a term not exceeding two years.
Such person may
be discharged at any time by order of the same Court :" Section 3978, Rev. Stat. A similar statute is in force in the city
of Noew York, providing also for such discharge whenever the
cause for such detention is removed : Knapp's Law relating
to the P. I. L & Habitual Drunkards, pp. 100-102. These
statutes all go upon the theory of personal disability or want
of self-control, which exposes the victim or others to danger
or his estate to loss. These conditions create the necessity of
intervention by the State through its authorized agency, as
the needed physician-the Good Samaritan-the temporary
guardian. The purpose of such guardianship is humane, beneficent and paternal, but the lawful right to its continuance
is limited to the period of such disability or want of self-control. Since the only right of such confinement springs from
the necessities resulting from such conditions, the removal of
the conditions, and hence the necessities, when judicially
ascertained, terminate the right: Tied. Lim. Police Powers,
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114, 116, § 46, and cases there cited. But the Act in question
goes upon an entirely different theory. According to it, "any
person * * * being an inebriate, habitual or common drunk-

ard" may be convicted thereof, and if "some relative or
friend" gives the requisite bond, he must "be sentenced to
imprisonment or confinement" for a period to be definitely
fixed by the Judge within certain limits. Such conviction is
not made dependent upon his inability to attend to business,
nor to any want of self-control, nor upon his being dangerous
to himself or others, but solely upon his "being an inebriate,
habitual or common drunkard." Just what would make a
person such is not very clearly defined. Manifestly it was
intended that the drunkenness should be repeated to the
extent of becoming habitual, but just how frequently it should
occur, or the extent of the delirium or stupefaction, is left as a
matter of fact to be determined by those who might differ
widely in regard to it. Such habit might exist, and yet the
victim be kind and generous-hearted, fully capable of attending to his business, gradually increasing his estate, tenderly
providing for the wants of any dependant upon him, and without at all endangering the personal safety of himself or others.
Such may be the condition of this relator for aught that
appears in this record. True his condition may be so deplorable as to require confinement under the general statute mentioned or even such as to properly call for punishment. But,
as we have seen, such is not the purpose of the Act in question. The relator has never been convicted of any penal
offence known to the law, even before a Judge at chambers,
much less in any Court of Law. The purpose of the Act is
not to guard merely during disability or want of self-control,
or danger of personal safety, but to imprison for a fixed
period, without the commission of any penal offence or any
trial in a Court of Law, merely by reason of the existence
of the condition named, and to satisfy the Act and the
"relative or friend" who kindly furnishes the requisite bond.
Besides, the Act contemplates no restoration-no possibility
of reformation within the time thus arbitrarily fixed. Not
having been convicted of any offence known to the law, it
would seem that he is beyond the reach of executive clem-
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ency: Section 6, art. 5, Const. Wis. From what has been
said it appears that the relator stands before the Court innocent of any offence known to the law, and yet committed
"to imprisonment or confinement" fbr the period of two
years, upon a commitment issued by a Judge at chambers,
and without any authorized process from any Court of Law.
If the Legislature may thus authorize imprisonment for two
years without the commission of any offence made punishable by law, then it may do so for ten or twenty years. It
is the question of power merely with which we are concerned.
While the State should take compassionate charge of any
who are dangerous to themselves or others, it is equally
bound to protect the personal rights and liberties of every
harmless and law-abiding citizen capable of taking care of
himself, his family and his property, however weak and unfortunate he may be in other respects. So sacred are certain
rights of the citizen that they are especially guarded by our
National Constitution; which among other things declares
that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws:" Section 1, art. 14, Amend. Const. U. S. In Mugler v.
K*ansas, supra, it is said by the Court: "Undoubtedly the
State, when providing by legislation for the protection of
the public health, the public morals, or the public safety is
subject to the paramount authority of the Constitution of
the United States, and may not violate rights secured or
guaranteed by that instrument, or interfere with the execution of the powers confided to the general government." As
indicated, the Act in question does not proceed upon the
theory of protecting the public health, nor the public morals,
nor the public safety, nor the personal safety of the victim,
nor as a punishment for crime. On the contrary it proceeds
upon the sole theory that the victim may be arrested, brought
before a Judge of a Court of Record at chambers, and if
found by him to be an "inebriate, habitual or common
drunkard," he may, without the existence of any other fact or
Vor. XXXVI.-90
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condition, and without any trial in any Court of Law, imprison him for two years, without any provision for his release.
We are forced to the conclusion that the relator has been
deprived of his liberty, without due process of law, and denied the equal protection of the law: YiEck Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356; In re Ah Jow, U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist. Cal., August 23, 1886, 29 Fed. Rep. 181; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98;
Slate v. Ray, 63 N. H. 406; Frazee's Case, S. Ct. Mich., October 28, 1886. Under our Constitution the relator was "entitled to a certain remedy in the law" for such injury and
wrong: Section 9, art. 1. This entitled him to a discharge.
The order of the Court commissioner is reversed.
The common law has always
guarded with great jealousy the personal liberty of the citizen. The
Great Charter gave a guarantee that
this right should not be invaded, except in accordance with the law of the
land. The written constitutions of
the various States likewise provide
generally, that a citizen shall be free
to pursue his own pleasure, except so
far as his liberty may be restrained
by the "law of the land," or "by
due process of law." And the Constitution of the United States, by the
fourteenth Amendment, has extended
its control over the States, by declaring that no State shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." The
phrases "due process of law" and
"the law of the land" have been
construed generally to mean the same
thing. Perhaps as accurate and comprehensive a definition of this expression as can be given is the one used
by Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth
College Case. He says: "By the law
of the land is most clearly intended
the general law; a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds
upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial. The meaning is that
every citizen shall hold his life, lib-

erty, property, and immunities under
the protection of the general rules
which govern society. Everything
which may pass under the form of an
enactment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land." In determining, therefore, in a particular
case, whether the citizen has been
unjustly deprived of his liberty, the
inquiry must ascertain whether the
enactment under which he is tried is
constitutional, and whether the mode
of trial has been in accordance with
the rules of the common law and our
constitutional guarantees.
And in
the inquiry as to what is due process
of law, the answer must depend upon
principles and not upon mere matters
of form.
Due process, so far as the method
of trial where one is accused of a
crime or misdemeanor is concerned,
requires that the accused shall have
the legal preliminary hearing after
proper arrest; that he must be confronted with the witnesses against
him; shall have assistance of counsel;
shall have the question of his guilt
determined by a jury; shall be entitled to a speedy and public trial;
shall be convicted upon legal evidence; shall not be compelled to testify against himself. Where the law
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has been changed so as to allow a
prisoner to testify in his own behalf,
a question has arisen as to what inference may be drawn from his refusal
to so testify. In some States the
statute provides that no legal inference shall be drawn against tbe criminal from this refusal. In some cases
the courts have directed that no such
inference can be drawn, while others
have held that such act of the prisoner might be taken into consideration by the jury in coming to their
conclusion as to his guilt or innocence.
These principles have been repeated
frequently in various cases : Wynehamer v. People, 12 N. Y. 378; State
v. Allen, 2 McCord (S. C.) 55; Sears
v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Hoke v. Ienderson, 4 Dev. 1; Janes v. Reynolds, 2
Texas, 251; Kinnard v. Louisiana, 92
U. S.480; Murray v. Hloboken Co., 18
How. 272; Dartmouth College v. Wloodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (Mr. Webster's
argument); Brown v. Hummel, 6
Penna. St. 86; Norman v. Ieist, 5
W. & S. (Pa.) 171; State v. Cleares,
59 Me. 298; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal.
522; Cooley's Const. Lim. 356.
The Constitution of the United
States, in its fourteenth Amendment,
does not create nor confer any new
rights, but merely provides that no
State shall illegally interfere with the
rights already possessed, and that
where a State, from local prejudice or
other cause, has deprived any person
of his rights under the law, redress
may be obtained by resort to, the
Courts of the United States. In explaining the meaning of the phrase
"due process of law," as contained
in the fifth Amendment, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Murray
v. H-oboken Co., 18 How. 272, decide
that this expression "does not necessarily imply a regular proceeding in
a Court of justice or after the manner

of such Court."
The Court has,
however, been frequently called upon
to interpret this expression since the
adoption of the fourteenth Amendment.
They have, however, never
given an exhaustive definition of it,
but have simply said what it did or
did not mean in the case before them.
Justice MILLER, in his opinion in
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
in justification of this course, says:
" It must be confessed, however, that
the constitutional meaning or value of
the phrase, 'due process of law,' remains to-day without that satisfactory
precision of definition which judicial
decisions have given to nearly all the
other guarantees of personal rights
found in the constitutions of the several States and of the United States.
* * * It would seem from the character of many of the cases before us
that the clause under consideration is
looked upon as a means of bringing
to the test, of the decisions of this
Court, the abstract opinions of every
unsuccessful litigant in a State Court
of the justice of the decision against
him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be
founded. If, therefore, it were possible
to define what it is for a State to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in
terms which would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the
State, and exclude those which are
Tot, no more useful construction
could be furnished by this or any
other Court to any part of the fundamental law. But apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any
definition which would be at once
perspicuous, comprehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think,
in the ascertaining of the intent and
application of such an important
phrase in the Federal Constitution, by
the gradual process of judicial inclu-
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sion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, with
the reasoning on which such decisions
may be founded."
Somewhat different considerations
will influence the Court in the interpretation of the clause, "without due
process," when they are deciding
questions of United States law, as enforced in the United States Courts, or
when, on the other hand, they are
deciding whether a State has offended
against the fourteenth Amendment.
An enactment, which might violate
some of the general principles of constitutional law which the Court could
enforce, in the former case, might not,
if passed by a State Legislature, deprive a person of due process, within
the meaning of the fourteenth Amendment. A State has a right, within
certain limits, of altering the mode of
judicial proceeding without violiting
this provision. The principle is expressed by the Court, in Davidson v.
New Orleans(supra), in this language:
"It is not possible to hold that a party
has, without due process of law, been
deprived of his property when, as regards the issue affecting it, he has, by
the laws of the State, a fair trial in a
Court of justice according to the modes
of proceeding applicable to such a
In this case the State had
case."
made an assessment upon real estate
in New Orleans to pay the expense of
draining swamps in that city. It was
held that the requirement of due process of law had been complied with
when the State statute had provided
that such assessment, before it became
effectual, must be submitted to a
Court of justice, with notice to the
owners of the property, all of whom
had the right to appear and contest
the assessment.
An erroneous decision by a State
Court is not such deprivation of property without due process as will sup-

port an appeal to the United States
Court: Arrowsmith v. Harmoning,
Adin'r, etc., 118 U. S. 194. This case
holds that a State has performed its
constitutional duty in this regard
when it enacts laws for the government of its Courts, while exercising
their respective jurisdictions, which,
if followed, will furnish parties with
the constitutional guarantees of life,
liberty, and property.
A State may provide a different
mode of trial than by jury, in a civil
case: WValker v. S'awinet, 92 U. S. 90.
Most of the State enactments, which
bear upon the personal liberty of the
citizen, and which have come before
the Supreme Court of the United States
for a decision of their constitutionality,
have grown out of the exercise of the
police power of the State. Blackstone, Lib. 4, page 162, defines the
police power to include "the due
regulation and domestic order of the
kingdom, whereby the individuals of
the State, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and
good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." Cooley says, "The
police of a State, in a comprehensive
sense, embraces its whole system of
internal regulations, by which the
State seeks not only to preserve the
public order and to prevent offences
against the State, but also to establish,
for the intercourse of a citizen with
citizens, those rules of good manners
and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights
and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as
it is reasonably consistent with a like
enjoyment of rights by others."
Numerous cases have presented to the
United States Supreme Court for decision the question how far the States

STATE v. RYAN.
have violated the fourteenth Amendment by the exercise of their police
power. This Court has frequently
announced that the Amendment did
not deprive a State of the exercise of
this power. The State has the same
right to the lawful exercise of this
power that it ever had. The United
States Court will, however, see that
the State enactment is a fair and legal
exercise of this power and not a mere
pretence for infringing the liberty of
the citizen.
In lVillarnette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, it was held that
an appropriation, by Congress, of
money to be expended in the improvement of a navigable river is no assumption of police power over it; nor
does the conferring of the privileges
of a port of entry come in conflict with
the police powers of a State which
have been exercised In bridging its
own navigable rivers below such port.
In the Slaughter-house Cases, 16
Wall. 36, the Court decided that the
State had the right to grant to a corporation, formed under the State's authority, the exclusive privilege of
maintaining a slaughter-house and
slaughtering cattle therein. That in
doing this, the Commonwealth was
properly exercising its police power,
and such exercise was no infringement
of the provisions of the fourteenth
Amendment. And in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, the right of the
State to prescribe regulations for the
carrying on of the business of warehouses, exclusively within her limits,
was affirmed. And it was held that
among the powers inherent in every
sovereignty was that of regulating the
conduct of citizens towards each other,
and the manner in which each shall
use his own property; that an owner
of property who devotes it to a public
use grants in effect to the public an
interest in such use, and must, there-

fore, to that extent submit to the public's control.
The right of a State to legislate in
behalf of the public health, economy
and morals has been affirmed in the
most emphatic manner. In one of the
most recent cases, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, it is declared
"that the prohibition of the manufacture out of oleaginous substances,
or out of any compound thereof
other than that produced from unadulterated milk, of an article designed to take the place of butter or
cheese produced from pure unadulterated milk; or the prohibition upon
the manufacture of any imitation or
adulterated butter or cheese, or upon
the selling or offering for sale, or
having in possession with intent to
sell the same, as an article of food, is
a lawful exercise by the State of the
power to protect by police regulations
the public health." And further,
"whether the manufacture of such
article is, or may be conducted in such
a way, or with such skill or secrecy,
as to baffle ordinary inspection, or
whether it involves such danger to
the public health, as to require, for
the protection of the people, the entire
suppression of the business, rather
than its regulation, in' such manner
as to permit the manufacture and sale
of articles of that class that do not
contain noxious ingredients, are questions of fact and of public policy,
which belong to the legislative department to determine."
In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
an exercise of the police power of the
State, even more extreme than that
of the preceding case, was justified.
The State had prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor for general
use, as a beverage; and had declared
that any place kept and maintained
for the illegal manufacture and sale
of liquor should be deemed a common
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nuisance and be abated. The Supreme Court of the United States
upheld this law. They held that such
prohibition was fairly adapted to protect the community against the evils
of intemperance: that forbidding the
use of property for purposes of manufacture, etc., of liquor was not a taking for the public benefit, and the
destruction of such property, in the
abatement of a nuisance, does not deprive the owner of it without due
process of law. The principles upon
which the Supreme Court will act in
determining whether a State has improperly exercised her police power
areiwell expressed by Justice HARLAa,
who delivered the opinion. He says:
"It does not follow that every statute
enacted ostensibly for the promotion
of these ends, is to be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the police powers
of the State. There are, of necessity,
limits beyond which legislation cannot
rightfully go. While every possible
presumption is to be indulged in favor
of the validity of a statute, the Courts
must obey the Constitution, rather
than the law-making department of
government, and must, upon their
own responsibility, determine whether
in any particular case, these limits
have been passed. The Courts are
not bound by mere forms, nor are
they to be misled by mere pretences.
They are at liberty-indeed, are under
a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended the limits of
its authority. If, therefore, a statute
purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to these
objects, or is a palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the Courts to so
adjudge and thereby give effect to the

Constitution.
They (the Courts)
have nothing to do with the mere
policy of legislation. And so, if, in
the judgment of the Legislature, the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors,
as a beverage, would tend to cripple,
if it did not defeat, the efforts to guard
the community against the evils attending the excessive use of such
liquors, it is not for the Courts, upon
their views as to what is best and
safest for the community, to disregard
the legislative determination of that
question." See, also, .Barbierv. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27.
A State has the right to regulate its
mode of criminal procedure within
proper limits, and by doing so, will
not infringe the fourteenth Amendment. In Hurtado v. California, 110
U. S. 516, it was held that "due process of law" in this amendment did
not require an indictment by a grand
jury in a prosecution by a State for
murder. The State statute provided
for a hearing by a magistrate, with
the right of the accused to be present
with counsel and to cross-examine ;
and upon such hearing, he could be
held for trial by ajury. The Supreme
Court decided that an indictment or
presentment by a grand jury was not,
under the common law of England,
essential to "due process of law."
In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131; s.
c. 27 AERICAX LAw REGISTER, 23, the

State law, upon the subject of the selection of jurors, contained the following provision: "In the trial of any
criminal cause, the fact that a person
called as ajuror has formed an opinion
or impression, based upon rumor or
newspaper statements (about the truth
of which he has expressed no opinion),
shall not disqualify him to serve as a
juror in such case, if he shall upon
oath state that he believes he can
fairly and impartially render a verdict
therein in accordance with the law
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and the evidence, and the Court shall
be satisfied of the truth of such statement." In this case the State Court
ruled that, under this statute, - "it is
not a test question whether the juror
will have the opinion which he has
formed from the newspapers changed
by the evidence, but whether his verdict will be based only upon the account whicli may here be given by
witnesses under oath." One of the
defendants offered himself as a witness, and then objected to the extent
of the cross-examination to which he
was subjected. An application was
made to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of error on
account of these alleged irregularities
in the trial. This Court decided that
the interpretation put upon this
statute by the State Court did not deprive the accused of a trial by an impartial jury, and, therefore, they
would not be, by conviction, deprived
of their lives without due process of
law. And further, that the extent of
the cross-examination of a defendant,
whether it must be confined to matters
pertinent to his testimony in chief or
may be extended to matters in issue,
was not a Federal question.
One of the purposes of the fourteenth Amendment, in its application
to criminal trials, is to see that no unjust discrimination is made between
citizens. As the Court say in United
States v. Uruikshank et al., 92 U. S.
542, this amendment "prohibits a
State from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The equality of
the rights of citizens is a principle of
republicanism.
Every republican
government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment
of this principle, if 'within its power.
That duty was originally assumed by
the States, and it still remains there.
The only obligation resting upon the

United States is to see that the States
do not deny the right. This the
Amendment guarantees, but no more.
The power of the national government
is limited to the enforcement of this
guaranty."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 356, brought before the United
States Supreme Court, the construction of an ordinance of the city of San
Francisco. This provided that a laundry must be of brick or stone, unless
the consent of the supervisors to a different construction was obtained; that
without the consent of this beard, no
scaffolding could be erected on the
roof of any building; the violation of
this ordinance was made a misdemeanor. It was admitted upon the
record that only Chinese had been arrested for a violation of this regulation,
while others had not been molested;
and that the petitions of Chinese for
the permission of the supervisors had
been uniformly refused, while those
of other persons had been granted.
The State Supreme Court held that
the action of the supervisors under
the ordinance was justifiable. The
Supreme Court of the United States,
however, decided that they had the
right to put their own construction
upon the ordinance; that the United
States Constitution had been violated
because the city regulation conferred
upon the authorities "arbitrary power,
at their own will and without regard
to discretion in the legal sense, to give
or withhold consent as to persons or
places, without regard to the competency of the persons, or the propriety of the place selected." And
further, "that the' guarantees of protection, in the fourteenth Amendment,
extended to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, without regard to differences
of race, color, or nationality."
In the above case of State v. _Ryan,
the judge of the State Court by decid-
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ing that the prisoner had been found
guilty without due process of law and
in violation of the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, and by ordering his discharge,
prevented an extremely interesting
question of constitutional law, as it
affects the right of personal liberty,
from coming before the United States
Court for decision. The Wisconsin
statute is certainly somewhat obscure.
The learned Court seems to be in great
doubt as to the nature of the Act, and
gravely inform us that " if it be regarded as penal, then its validity
would seem to turn upon widely different considerations than if it were
paternal; and if it is to be regarded
as paternal, then its validity would
seem to turn upon widely different
considerations than if it were penal."
To become gloriously drunk in strict
privacy has, heretofore, been regarded
as one of the natural rights of the
citizen, which is beyond the public
control; while intoxication which leads
to breach of the peace or infringement
of the rights of others may place its
victim within the power of the law.
And commitment to an inebriate asylum has been held to infringe the
right of personal liberty where it has
been done upon ex pare affidavits,
and without affording a chance to be
heard and a proper examination be-

fore a judge or officer and a jury; In
re Adrian Janes, 30 How. Pr. R. 446.
The act in question would seem to
refer not to private drunkenness. It
provides that a person charged with
habitual or common drunkenness
shall be tried. An habitual or common drunkard is known to be such to
the community. It further provides
for a trial before a Judge of a Court of
Record, and the mode of trial is defined
to be the same as that before a justice
of the peace; and, from the statement,
in the opinion of the Court of what
was upon the record, the trial would
seem to have been before a jury. The
question, therefore, would seem to be
whether the State has the right, under
its police power, either to punish or
commit for reformation, a person who
has been, after full investigation,
found to be a common drunkard. It
has been decided that a State may, in
the fair exercise of its police power,
make it an offence for a citizen to
manufacture liquor for his own use,
if the public by their Legislature say
that such conduct is prejudicial to the
good morals of the community:
Mugler v. Kansas, supra. There are
very good reasons for holding that
the example of drunkenness may also
be very injurious to the public
Wx. H. BUIaETT.
morals.
Philadelphia.
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HUNCKEL v. VONEIFF.
A witness is privileged to cast a grossly slanderous reflection upon a party
to the controversy, in response to a question asked during the examination of
the witness, and which might have been answered without making.such reflection. An action for slander or libel will not lie for such answer.
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action of libel.
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MILLER, J. (June 13, 1888.) This is an action of libel or
slander against a witness in an equity cause, whose testimony was written down by the examiner, returned to the
Court, and read at the hearing before the Judge. The alleged
libellous or slanderous statements are contained in the testimony thus taken. There was a demurrer to each of the
two counts in the declaration, which the Court sustained and
thereupon gave judgment for the defendants. From that
judgment this appeal is taken.
In the able arguments of counsel the whole field of the law
on the question of privilege has been explored, and we believe
all the decisions, as well as the opinions and dicta of eminent
Judges, have been cited and pressed upon our attention. It
would be a tedious task to review them in detail, and a hopeless one to attempt to reconcile them. The question is a new
one in this State. No precedent for such an action has been
found in our reports or judicial records, and we believe this is
the first attempt to bring one since a Court of Justice was
first established in the Colony of Maryland, a period of more
than two centuries. This fact, while it may not be conclusive against the right to maintain the action, certainly leaves
us free to follow and adopt those authorities which state the
law in accordance with what, in our judgment, the administration of justice and a sound public policy demand.
The case now before us is not that of an advocate but of a
witness, and in our opinion it is of the greatest importance to
the administration of justice that witnesses should go upon
the stand with their minds absolutely free from apprehension
that they may subject themselves to an action of slander for
what they may say while giving their testimony. Mr. Townshend, in his book on Slander and Libel, well says: "The
due administration of justice requires that a witness should
speak according to his belief, the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, without regard to the consequences; and
he should be encouraged to do this by the consciousness, that
VOL. XXXVI.-91
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except for any wilfully false statement (which is perjury), no
matter that his testimony may in fact be untrue, or that loss
to another ensues by reason of his testimony, no action for slander can be maintained against him. It is not simply a matter
between individuals; it concerns the administration of justice.
The witness speaks in the hearing and under the control of the
Court; is compelled to speak, with no right to decide what
is immaterial; and he should not be subject to the possibility
of an action for his words :" Townshend, Slander & L. § 223.
But there is more substantial authority for the absolute
character of the privilege. In the standard work of Starkie
on Slander, it is laid down as the result of the English decisions, that "witnesses, like jurors, appear in court in obedience to the authority of the law, and therefore may be considered, as well as jurors, to be acting in the discharge of a
public duty; and though convenience requires that they
should be liable to a prosecution for perjury committed in the
course of their evidence, or for conspiracy, in case of a combination of two or more to give false evidence, they are not
responsible in a civil action for any reflections thrown out in
delivering their testimony :" 1 Starkie, Slander, 242.
This statement of the law has been frequently quoted with
approval by the English Courts, and in some instances by
Courts and text-writers in this country: Terry v. Fellows,'21
La. Ann. 375 (1869).
In support of the absolute character of the privilege, a long
list of English decisions, ancient and modern, has been cited.
Without referring to the earlier ones, we mention some of
those decided in more recent times, which have special reference to the case of parties and witnesses: Bevis v. Smith, 86
Eng. C. Law, 126 (1856); Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 Hurlst.
& N. 568 (1859); Kennedy v. Hilliard, 10 Irish C. L. 195
(1860); Dawkins v. Rokeby, 4 Fost. & F. 806 (1866); -Dawkins
v. Rokeby, L. R. 18 Q. B. 255 (1873); s. c. on appeal in the
House of Lords, L. R. 7 H. L. Eng. & Irish App. 744 (1875).
In these cases WILLES, COLERIDGE, C. J., CoOKBURN, C. J.,
BLACKBURN, KELLY, C. B., CRESSWELL, Lord CAIRNS, and other
eminent jurists, have again and again expressed the opinion
that the privilege of a witness should be absolute, have
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pointed out the great benefit of such privilege to the administration of justice, and have deprecated in strong terms the
evil consequences they thought would ensue if witnesses were
placed under any intimidation, or the fear of being involved
in litigation by reason of what they might say when under
examination. In -Dawkinsv. 1?okeby, the Judges were called in,
and gave unanimously an answer to the question put to them
by the House of Lords, in which they say: "A long series
of decisions has settled that no action will lie against a witness for what he says or writes in giving evidence before a
Court of Justice. This does not proceed on the ground that
the occasion rebuts the prima facie presumption that words
disparaging to another are maliciously spoken or written. If
that were all, evidence of express malice would remove this
ground. But the principle, we apprehend, is that public
policy requires that witnesses should give their testimony
free from any fear of being harassed by an action, on an allegation, whether true or false, that they acted from malice.
The authorities as regards witnesses in the ordinary Courts
of Justice are numerous and uniform."
After this decision, the case of Seaman v. Netherclift arose,
which was tried before C. J. COLERIDGE, at visi prius, and
afterwards decided by him and BRETT, J., in L. R. 1 C. P.
Div. 540 ; and subsequently by the Court of Appeals in L. R.
2 0. P. Div. 53 (1876). The Judges who heard the case on
appeal, were COCKBURN, 0. J., BRAMWELL, A. J., and AMPHLETT,
A. J., and they disposed of it at once.

COCKBURN,

C. J., said:

"If there is anything as to which the authority is overwhelming, it is that a witness is privileged to the extent of what he
says in course of his examination. Neither is that privilege
affected by the relevancy or irrelevancy of what he says; for
then he would be obliged to judge of what is relevant or
irrelevant, and questions might be, and are, constantly asked
which are not strictly relevant to the issue. But that, beyond
all question, this unqualified privilege extends to a witness,
is established by a long series of cases, the last of which is
-Dawkinsv. 1okeby, after which to contend to the contrary is
hopeless. It was there expressly decided that the evidence
of a witness, with reference to the inquiry" (the inquiry
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referred to being a military court of inquiry instituted to investigate the conduct of an officer) "is privileged, notwithstanding it may be malicious; and to ask us to decide to the
contrary is to ask what is beyond our power. But I agree
that if in this case, beyond being spoken maliciously, the
words had not been spoken in the character of a witness, or
not while he was giving evidence in the case, the result might
have been different. For I am very far from desiring to be
considered as laying down as law, that what a witness states
altogether out of the character and sphere of a witness, or
what he may say dehors the matter in hand, is necessarily
protected. I quite agree that what he says before he enters
or after he has left the witness-box is not privileged, which
was the question in the case (Trottrnan v. Dunn, 4 Camp. 211)
before Lord ELLENBOROUGH. Or if a man when in the witness-box were to take advantage of his position to utter something having no reference to the cause or matter of inquiry
in order to assail the character of another, as if he were asked,
' Were you at York on a certain day ?'and he were to answer, ' Yes, and A. B. picked my pocket there;' it certainly
might well be said in such a case that the statement was altogether dehors the character of witness, and hot within the
privilege."
So, in speaking upon the same subject, BRAMWELL, A. J.,
says: "Suppose while the witness is in the box, a man were
to come in at the door, and the witness were to exclaim,
' That man picked my pocket;' I can hardly think that
would be privileged. I can scarcely think a witness would
be protected for anything he may say in the witness-box, wantonly and without reference to the inquiry. I do not say he
would not be protected. It might be held that it was better
that everything that a witness said, as a witness, should be
protected, than that witnesses should be under the impression
that what they said in the witness-box might subject them
to an action. I certainly should pause before I affirmed so
extreme a proposition, but without affirming that, I think
the words ' having reference to the inquiry' ought to have a
very wide and comprehensive application, and ought not to
be limited to statements for which, if not true, a witness
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might be indicted for perjury, or the exclusion of which by
the Judge would give ground for a new trial; but ought to
extend to that which a witness might naturally and reasonably say when giving evidence with reference to th inquiry as
to which he had been called as a witness."
.AmPHLETT, A. J., on the same subject, says: "How it
would have been if this statement had been volunteered by
the defendant, without it being necessary or in any way arising from questions he had been asked, we need not express
any opinion. In such a case it may be that the words would
not have been spoken in his office of a witness. I must by
no means be taken as expressing an opinion that in such a
case the witness would not be protected. I can see many reasons why a witness should be absolutely protected from anything he said in the witness-box. If he did voluntarily make
a scandalous attack while giving evidence he would be guilty
of a gross contempt of Court, and might be committed to
prison by the presiding Judge; or if he were before an inferior tribunal, and he persevered in his scandalous statements,
he might be liable to an indictment for obstructing the course
of justice."
Much also was said as to the privilege of a witness in the
still more recent case of .Xunster v. Lamb, in the Court of Appeals, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 588 (1888); 23 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER, 12; and we feel ourselves at liberty to adopt, if
we choose, what was said in that case on that subject. The
Judges, BRETT and FRY, there again affirm the absolute character of this privilege in the broadest terms. "Why," says
FRY, L. J., "should a witness be able to avail himself of his
position in the box and to make without fear of civil consequences a false statement, which in many cases is perjurei,
and which is malicious and affects the character of another?
The rule of law exists, not because the conduct of those persons ought not of itself to be actionable, but because if their
conduct was actionable, actions would be brought against
Judges and witnesses in cases in which they had not spoken
with malice, in which they had not spoken with falsehood.
It is not a desire to prevent actions from being brought in
cases where they ought to be maintained that has led to the
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adoption of the present rule of law; but it is the fear that if
the rule were otherwise, numerous actions would be brought
against persons who were merely discharging their duty. It
must always be borne in mind that it is not intended to protect malicious and untruthful persons, but that it is intended
to protect persons acting bonafide, who under a different rule
would be liable, not perhaps to verdicts and judgments against
them, but to the vexation of defending actions ;" and he
refers to the fact that Courts of Justice have control over all
proceedings before them, and have ample powers to check improper conduct on the part of witnesses as well as solicitors
and counsel.
Such are the English decisions. As to authority on the
same subject in this country we have already referred to
what has been said by Mr. Townshend, in his book on
Slander and Libel, and we have the authority of Judge
among the cases which are so absoCOOLEY to the effect that 1"
lutely privileged on reasons of public policy that no inquiry
into motives is permitted in an action for slander or libel, is
that of a witness giving evidence in the course of judicial
proceedings. It is familiar law that no action will lie
against him at the suit of a party aggrieved by his false testimony, even though malice be charged ;" and for this a number of authorities from different States are cited: Cooley,
Const. Lim. 545.
Again: Mr. Wait seems to adopt the English cases as laying down the true rule: 7 Wait, Act. & Def. 438.
A different view as to the extent of this privilege has been
taken by the Courts of many of the States, and it may be
conceded that the weight of authority in this country is in
favor of a much greater restriction upon the privilege than
is sanctioned by the English decisions. But we are not controlled by any decision of our own Courts, and are at liberty
to settle the law for this State according to our best judgment. After a most careful consideration of the subject, we
are convinced that the privilege of a witness should be as
absolute as it has been decided to be by the English authorities we have cited, and we accordingly adopt the law on this
subject as they have laid it down.
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It remains to apply this law to the case before us. The
declaration does not state definitely what the controversy or
matter of inquiry in the equity case of Manning v. Voneiff
actually was. Enough is stated, however, to warrant the
inference that the female plaintiff was a party to that suit,
or was preferring a claim in some capacity to the estate, or
some part of it, of a Mr. Plitt, deceased, and that the witness
or her husband was resisting that claim. The defendant was
examined as a witness in that case, and so far as her testimony is set out in the declaration, it appears she was first
asked if she remembered quite distinctly the day on which
her husband told her he was copying certain deeds at Mr.
Plitt's request. To this she replied that the saw her husband
copying some papers; that he had a file of papers, copying
them, and she being inquisitive asked him what he was writing, and he said he was copying some deeds Mr. Plitt asked
him to copy. She was then asked, "Was that the same day
on which the magistrate came to see Mr. Plitt?" To this
she replied, "No, I don't think so." She was then asked,
"Well, how many days about intervened ?" To this she
replied, "Not knowing that a mistress or woman of Mr.
Plitt's would step in to claim the lawful wife's property, I
did not keep an account of the date that way; if I would
have, I would have noticed the date and all those little particular incidents to save Mrs. Plitt from much heartache and
trouble and cause of her death." This is the libel or slander
complained of. Now it is true she could have answered the
question by simply saying she "did not remember." It is
also true that the imputation thus cast upon the plaintiff was
grossly slanderous. She may have made it from malice, knowing at the same time that it was false, and from the averments
of the declaration which the demurrer admits we must so take
it. Still it was the excuse she chose to give as to not remembering the date about which she had been pressed by this
and two previous questions. It is, as we consider it, nothing
more than a reflection cast upon a party to the controversy in
answer to a question which could have been answered without making such reflection. The answer might have been
expunged from the record and the witness punished for mak-
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ing it, but it is quite impossible to say that she did not make
it in her character as witness, or that it is at all like the examples put by the Judges in Seaman v. Netherlift, as being
outside of the privilege.
Judgment affirmed.

ROBINSON, J. (dissenting). The absolute and unqualified
privilege of a witness as laid down in this case, is, in my

opinion, a departure from the well-settled law on the subject.
I agree that a witness is absolutely protected as to everything
said by him, having relation or reference to the subject-matter of inquiry before the Court. But if he takes advantage
of his position as a witness to assail wantonly the character
of another and to utter maliciously what he knows to be
false, in regard to a matter that has no relation or reference
to the matter of inquiry, he is, in my opinion, both on principle and authority, liable in an action of slander. I must,
therefore, enter my dissent to the judgment in this case.
BRYAN, J., also dissents.
The question decided by the above
case, and to be discussed in this note,
may be stated thus : Is a witness absolutely protected from suit for slanderous charges made by him in the
witness-box, or does his privilege extend only to those statements which
are pertinent to the proceeding in
which lie is testifying?
All authorities and writers agree in
giving to a witness a certain privilege
in his character as witness ; and the
grounds on which this privilege rests
are most reasonable and satisfactory.
We need not repeat here what is said
on this point in the case above nor in
the various text-books and decisions.
All unite in the doctrine that public
policy and the due administration of
justice require that witnesses in judicial proceedings should be free to
speak out in regard to the matters in
controversy, without fear of being in
any way liable to suit for slander.
All agree, too, that no matter how

false and no matter how malicious
such statements of a witness may be,
he is nevertheless protected by his
privilege. It is only in regard to the
question of relevancy that the decisions are not harmonious.
From the cases quoted in the opinion above, it is obvious that the English judges have laid. down the rule
that a witness is absolutely privileged in what lie says in the course of
"Neither is that
his examination.
privilege affected by the relevancy of
what he says," are the words of Lord
CocxiwaN

in Seaman v. Netherc!fl, 2

C. P. D. 53 (1876), and the expressions of the other Judges in the case
are to the same effect. The instances
put by Lords COCKBuRN and BRAm-

in which the witness might be
liable, are not understood to mean
that relevancy is material, but are
given as examples of words spoken
outside of the character of witness.
It is, however, to be remarked that
WELL,
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the English Courts have never been
called upon to decide a case in which
the words complained of were not
pertinent to the cause in which they
were spoken. In Seanan v. Netherclift, from which the principal case
makes full quotations, "the statements complained of were strictly
pertinent to the matter in issue."
The possibility o. a different opinion,
as to the effect of irrelevant testimony, is suggested by Lord BAxwELL; the counsel for the defendant
"said he was prepared to maintain
that as long as a witness spoke as a
witness in the witness-box, he was
protected, whether the matter had
reference to the inquiry or not. I am
reluctant to affirm so extreme a proposition. * * * I can scarcely think
a witness would be protected in anything he might say in the witnessbox, wantonly and without reference
to the inquiry;" and the Judge remarks that the words "having reference to the inquiry" ought to have a
very wide and comprehensive application, and ought to extend to what a
witness might naturally and reasonably say when giving evidence. But,
notwithstanding these qualifying observations, there is no reason for
doubting that the judgment of the
Court means that the privilege of a
witness is absolute and that relevancy
or irrelevancy is not to be considered.
Henderson v. Broonhead,4 H. & N.
569 (1859), is another case in which
the liability of witnesses has been
discussed.
There an' action was
brought against a person who had
made a scandalous, false, and malicious affidavit, in a cause pending in
Court, for the purpose of defaming a
person not a party to the cause. In
the judgment in favor of the defendant, it is stated very broadly that
"no action will lie for words spoken
or written in the course of any judiVOL. XXXVI.-91

cial proceeding. By universal assent
it appears that in this county no such
action lies." In this case, however,
as in Seaman v. Ahetlerdjif, the words
were capable of being held relevant.
"1 can easily see how they might be
relevant," says EiLE, J.; so that the
judgment of the Court was not pronounced upon the legal effect of irrelevant testimony.
As stated in the principal case, the
question was also considered in Dawkiss v. Lord Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255
(1873). The defendant was sued for
slander uttered by him while a witness before a military Court, and it
was in effect held that as the defamatory words had been spoken by the
defendant while a witness before a
military Court, and had reference to
the subject-matter before that Court,
they were privileged, and whether
they were spoken falsely and maliciously were questions altogether immaterial. KELLy, C. B., in giving
judgment for the defendant, said:
"No action lies against a party or
witnesses for anything said or done,
though falsely or maliciously and
without any reasonable or probable
cause, in the ordinary course of any
proceeding in a Court of justice;"
and the observation of Lord MAxSFIELD is quoted, that "neither party,
witnesses, counsel, jury, nor judge
can be put to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in office." On
appeal to the House of Lords (L. R.
7 H. L. 744 (1875), this judgment
was affirmed, and, as quoted in the
principal case, it was said that "a
long series of decisions has settled
that no action will lie against a witness for what he says or writes in
giving evidence before a Court of
justice."
The latest English case upon the
subject is Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B.
Div. 588 (1883), 23 AMERICAN LAW
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REGISTER, 12. The action was against
a solicitor for slanderous words spoken
while acting as an advocate. In rendering judgment, BaETT, M. R., took
occasion to discuss the liability of
witnesses for slander, and his observations are as follows : "With regard
to witnesses the general conclusion is,
tiat all witnesses speaking with reference to the matter which is before
the Court, whether what tthey say is
relevant or irrelevant, whether what
they say is malicious or not, are exempt from liability to any action in
respect of what they state. It was at
one time suggested that although wit-

behalf, wholly irrespective of their
immateriality. The difficulty is often
great, to one skilled in the law, of
determining upon the questions of the
irrelevancy or immateriality of statements or of evidence. If a witness
shall be bound to determine first what
are the exact questions at issue in the
cause, and next what is the exact line
at which statements or evidence shall
be material, and to determine this at
the peril of an action for defamation
if he be wrong, if his word be defamatory, the protection which the
law professes to give him would be
nearly nugatory. That purpose is to
give him the courage to resort as a
nesses could not be held liable to an
party to the legal tribunals for justice
action upon the case for defamation,
or as a witness to give his evidence
nevertheless they might be held
before those tribunals, undeterred by
liable in another and different form of
the fear of a prosecution for libel. It
action on the case, namely, an action
is impossible that he can be free from
analogous to an action for malicious
prosecution, in which it would be al-- that fear, if his immunity must deleged that the statement complained
pend upon his not mistaking what is
of was false, to the knowledge of the
not material for what is, and upon his
witness, and was made maliciously
rightly distinguishing what is from
and without probable cause;" but
what is not libel or actionable slansuch an action cannot, according to
der." In the same case, GREEN, B.,
the authorities, be maintained.
after reviewing the cases in which the
We now come to the case of Kenprivilege of counsel in argument is
nedy v. Hilliard, 10 Ir. C. L. Rep. 195
held to be restricted to what is relevant
(1860), in which is to be found the
to the matter before the Court, says :
"Assuming the inquiry as to relemost careful examination of the quesvancy to be open and material in the
tion that has come from the Courts of
case of language used by a counsel, I
the British empire. The action was
cannot find any satisfactory authority
for libel, for false swearing in a judicial trial. In the course of a long
for the position that it is so in the
case of a party to a proceeding or a witopinion, and after a review of the
ness. Considering the foundation of
English cases and a statement of the
the rule, which is, that public policy
reasons on which they are based,
requires that a man shall not be dePIGOT, C. B., says: " In my judgment,
terred by the fear of an action from
the immunity of a party from an action
for defamation for what is said or
instituting a legal proceeding or giving
written or sworn br him on his own
full and free testimony for the adbehalf in a judicial proceeding, at- vancement of justice, I do not see how
taches whether what he states be or
the protection intended to be afforded
be not material. The reason of the to such a person can have its full and
rule of law which protects him ap- effectual operation, if he is, at his
plies to his statement on his own
peril, to see to the relevancy and per-
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tinence of his statement. A counsel
being legis peritus and retained for a
client and being at liberty to exercise
his own discretion, may possibly be
differently circumstanced. It may
not be unreasonable to expect from
him a greater degree of circumspection."
Turning now to the American decisions, we find that the principal case,
.unckel v. T7oneff", is the only one in
this country which adopts in full the
law as laid down in England. In
Louisiana, indeed, it was said in Terry
v. Fellows, 21 La. An. 375 (1869), that
"the administration of justice requires the testimony of witnesses to
be unrestrained by liability to vexatious litigation.
The words they
utter are protected by the occasion
and cannot be the foundation of an
action for slander." This case is
cited in Bunckel v. T'oneftr as an authority for the absolute privilege of a
witness, but its citation for that purpose is misleading since it was modified in the subsequent case of Burke
v. Ryan, 36 La. An. 951 (1884), by
"this qualification, that statements
thus made in the course of an action,
must be pertinent and material to the
issue."
The leading case in this country
upon privilege in judicial proceedings
is without doubt Hoar v. Wood, 3
Metc. 193 (1841). The action was
against a person who conducted a
prosecution before a justice of the
peace, and the question of the privilege of a witness was not directly involved. But the reasoning of SHAw,
C. J., in that case has been applied in
later Massachusetts cases to the privilege of witnesses, so that the observations of the learned judge are properly
considered. "We take the rule to be
well settled by the authorities," says
the Court, "that words spoken in the
course of judicial proceedings, though

they are such as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken elsewhere would import malice and be
actionable in themselves, are not
actionable if they are applicable and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry.
The question therefore in such cases
is whether the words were spoken in
the course of judicial proceedings and
whether they were relevant and pertinent to the cause or subject of inquiry. And in determining what is
pertinent much latitude must be allowed to the judgment and discretion
of those who are interested in the conduct of a case in Court, and a much
larger allowance made for the ardent
and excited feelings with which a party
or counsel may become animated. * **
Still this privilege must be restrained
by some limit, and we consider that
limit to be this : that a party or counsel
shall not avail himself of his situation
to gratify private malice by uttering
slanderous expressions either against
a party, witness, or third persons,
which have no relation to the cause
or subject matter of the inquiry."
In Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393
(1876), the privilege of a witness was
more directly considered. "It seems
to be settled by the English authorities," says the Court, "that
judges, counsel, parties, and witnesses
are absolutely exempted from liability
for defamatory words published in the
course of judicial proceedings. The
same doctrine is generally held in the
American Courts, with the qualification as to parties, counsel, and witnesses, that in order to be privileged,
the statements made in the course of an
action must be pertinent and material
to the case;" and the remarks of
SHAW, C. J., given above, were quoted
and approved. And in .VLaughlin v.
Cowley, 127 Mass. 316 (1879), after
stating the law as announced in Boar
v. Wood, the Court says: "The quali-
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fication of the English rule is adopted sequences of uttering the slander."
in order that the protection given to The opinion in this case is very offindividuals in the interest of an effi- hand, and contains no discussion of
cient administration of justice may principles nor citation of authorities.
not be abused as a cloak from beneath It seems, however, to have been rewhich to gratify private malice."
ferred to, without disapproval, in
In Vermont, the question has been Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309
considered in Mlower v. W atson, 11 (1872), in which it is said: "The
Vt. 536 (1839), in a careful opinion case (TVite v. Carroll) shows that
by Judge REDFIELD; and the con- the Court held that the answer given
clusion is that an action against a to the question put to the defendant
witness for slander is maintainable, if as a witness before the surrogate, was
the false statements were irrelevant not material and pertinent to the inand malicious. The defendant was quiry, and further held it privileged
sued for slander spoken while a party if the defendant when he gave it in
to a case on trial. The Court says: "If good faith believed it was."
any one considers himself aggrieved,
In Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wise. 193
in order to sustain an action for
(1860), a judgment was allowed to be
slander lie must show that the words entered against the defendant witness
spoken were not pertinent to the in the lower Court, but was reversed
matter in progress, and with a view on appeal. The true rule, it is said,
to defame him. So that if the words in regard to a witness's liability to an
spoken were pertinent to the matter action for what he may say pending
in issue, the party and counsel may his examination before a judicial
claim full immunity from an action of tribunal is that lie is not answerable
in damages for any statements he may
slander, however malicious might
have been his motive in speaking make, which are responsive to questhem. The plaintiff in order to main- tions put to him and which are not
tain his action must prove, first, that objected to and ruled out by the
the words spoken were not pertinent
Court, or concerning the impertito matter then in hand, and, second, nency or impropriety of which he rethat they were not spoken bonafide."
ceives no advice from the Court. If
White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161 what is said or written be pertinent
(1870), is hardly worthy of the at- and material to the cause or subjecttention sometimes given to it. W., matter of inquiry, the speaker or
an allopathic physician, while testi- writer is not liable to an action, howfying as a witness, went out of his ever much lie may be actuated by
way to call C., a hiomneopathic physi- hatred or ill-will. It is one of the
cian, a "quack."
In sustaining a many instances where the claims of
judgment for the plaintiff the Court the individual must yield to the dicsays: "If the defendant, in testify- tates of public policy.
ing as a witness, and as such entitled
In Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279
to the protection of law, in using the (1862), an action was brought against
words proved, was actuated by malice;
the defendant on account of slanderif he used the words for the mere ous interrogatories filed by him in a
purpose of defaming the plaintiff, case to which he was a party; and
then the law withdrew the protection while the opinion of the Court does
it would otherwise have afforded him, not specifically mention witnesses,
and he became amenable to the con- they seem to be included in the term
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parties. " To the catalogue of absolutely privileged communications belong all words spoken or written by
the Court, the parties, or their counsel, in the due course of judicial proceedings, which may be relevant.
The relevancy or pertinency of the
caluminous matter is indispensable to
its perfect and absolute freedom from
all actionable quality. The law designs, in the adoption of the principle
above stated, to relieve those participating in the proceedings of Courts of
justice from the restraint which might
result from the apprehension of lawsuits. The accomplishment of that
object does not require that the privilege should be extended further than
to relevant communications. A further extension would license malignity-to pervert judicial proceedings
to the accomplishment of its wicked
purposes. The avoidance of such a
consequence is scarcely less important
than the guarding of the unembarrassed freedom of judicial investigation." The latest American case, ex,
cepting .Hunckel v. rondff is Shodden
v. Mc.Elwee, Supr. Ct. Tenn., Nov.
1887, in which the defendant, on the
witness-stand, charged the plaintiff
with the theft of his horse. "The
act of testifying as a witness," says
the Court, "must be either in the exercise of a right or the performance of
a duty, and in either case the act
must be performed in good faith. If
he avails himself of his position as a
witness to maliciously answer with a
knowledge that such answer is not
pertinent or relevant, the law withdraws the protection it would otherwise have afforded him. * * * We
fully recognize the importance to a
due administration of justice, of upholding the privilege accorded parties
to write and speak freely in judicial
.proceedings; but in so doing, we must
not lose sight of the fact that it con-

cerns the peace of society that the
good name and repute of the citizen
shall not be exposed to the malice of
individuals, who, under the supposed
protection of absolute privilege, make
use of the witness-box to volunteer
defamatory matter in utterances not
pertinent. To hold such persons responsible in damages cannot fairly be
said to hamper the administration of
justice. The privilege of a witness
is great, but it must not be mistaken
for unbridled license."
To the above cases several may be
added to the same effect, but not so
satisfactory in discussion or citation :
Smith v. Howard, 28 Iowa, 51 (1869);
Morgan v. Booth, 13 Bush (Ky.), 480
(1877) ; Leav. White, 4 Sneed (Tenn.),
111 (1856); Barnes v. 2McCrate, 32
Me. 442 (1851); Wyatt v. Buell, 47
Cal. 624 (1874). There are still other
cases, commonly cited as authorities
by the text-book writers, which do
not, in reality, touch the question at
issue, and are of no value whatever
in the discussion : Briggs v. Byrd, 12
Iredell (N. Ca.), 377 (1851); Goslin
v. Cannon, 1 Harr. (Del.) 3 (1832);
Liles v. Gaster,42 Ohio St. 631 (1885) ;
Hill v. Niles, 9 N. H. 9 (1837); Verner
v. Verner, 64 Miss. 321 (1886) ; Hutchinson v. Lewis, 75 Ind. 55 (1881), and
many more.
In those jurisdictions where the
question is as yet unsettled the Courts
will no doubt be guided, in the conflict of authority, by their views regarding the requirements of public
The Maryland Court in
policy.
Hunckel v. Voneiff says, that being at
liberty to settle the law for Maryland
according to its best judgment it is
convinced, after consideration, that
"the privilege of a witness should be
as absolute as it has been decided to
be by the English authorities."
EDGAR G. MILLER, JR.
Baltimore.
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Supreme Court o? Alabama.
BUTLER v. ELYTON LAND CO.

ET AL.

In Alabama, the brother of a deceased intestate bastard by the same mother,
is entitled to inherit land of which such intestate dies seised, to the exclusion
of the mother.
The law is the same in Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia, but
otherwise in Missouri.
Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 207, 1820, not followed.
BILL in equity by Mary Butler, averring that she was the
mother of two illegitimate sons, one of whom had died, intestate, unmarried and without issue, possessed of a contract for
the purchase of certain real estate in Alabama, upon which
part payment had been made to the Land Company, and a
bond for title executed by them to him; that the surviving
son had obtained possession of said bond, and, claiming to be
the sole heir of his deceased brother, had disposed of the
same to Going, one of the defendants; that Going had
obtained title from the Land Company, and praying that
Going be decreedto hold the land for the use of the complainant, and that the Land Company be decreed to make
her a clear title to said land.
A demurrer, that complainant was not heir-at-law of her
deceased son, being sustained, appeal was taken to this Court.

-WTM. Brooks and Barnes & Barnes, for appellant.

Webb & Tiliman, for appellees.
This case turns on the proper construction
SOMERVILLE, J.
of our statute regulating inheritance between bastard children and their mothers and other kindred; the contest here
being one, in effect, between the mother and uterine brother
of a deceased bastard, who died seised and possessed of the
real estate in controversy.
These sections of the Code (1886) read as follows: See.
1921. "Every illegitimate child is considered as the heir of
his mother, and inherits her estate, in whole or in part, as the
case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock."
See. 1922. "The mother, or kindred of an illegitimate child,
on the part of the mother, are, in default of children of such
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illegitimate child, or their descendants, entitled to inherit his
estate." The inquiry is whether the mother, Mary Butler,
under this statute, takes the property of her deceased illegitimate son, Gus Peteet, to the exclusion of the latter's halfbrother, one Butler Whitney, of the blood of the same
mother. It is contended for appellant, that the latter section (section 1922) must be construed to mean that, in default
of children of an illegitimate child, the mother shall first
inherit; and if there be no mother living at the time of descent east, then the kindred of the illegitimate child on the
part of the mother shall be entitled to take his estate, and
not otherwise. The appellee, on the contrary, contends that
these sections of the Code are not complete within themselves, but are a part of an entire system of statutes on the
subject of descents and distributions, and are to be construed
in pari materia with them. The Judge of the City Court
adopted the latter view of the statute, and we fully concur
with him in this conclusion.
These sections are clearly not complete within themselves.
It is declared that the mother, or kindred on the part of the
mother, shall inherit. The word "kindred" means relations by blood, and includes collateral as well as lineal relations. It includes children of an intestate and their descendants, brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, cousins, uncles
and aunts, and other next of kin. How are these numerous
kindred to inherit, and which, if any of them, are to be preferred ? And what is to be the share of each one's inheritance? Necessarily, these inquiries are to be answered by
reference to the statutes of descents and distributions, which
form a part of the same chapter and article in the Code that
embrace the sections under consideration. Except so far as
declared otherwise, the rule of descent for real estate must
be governed by section 1915, Code 1886, and of personal property by section 1924, which precisely correspond to sections
2252,2261, Code 1876, the law in force at the time of the death
of the intestate in the year 1883. There is nothing in the statute indicating a purpose to give the mother a priority of right
over the other kindred whose rights are preferred by the
statute of descents. If this had been the legislative intent,
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it was easy of expression, as appears in the New York statute,
which declares that if an illegitimate child die intestate,
without descendants, the inheritance "shall descend to his
mother; if she be dead, it shall descend to the relatives of
the intestate on the part of the mother, as if the intestate had
been legitimate :" 3 Rev. Stat. N. Y., p. 42, § 14 (1859).
This construction is a necessary result from the settled rule
that, in construing a doubtful statute, all statutes in pari materia, or relating to the same general subject-matter, are to be
taken and examined together in order to arrive at the legislative intent. "All acts which relate to the same subject,"
said Lord MANSFIELD, in -Rex v. Loxdade, 1 Burr. 447, "notwithstanding some of them may be expired, or are not referred
to, must be taken to be one system, and construed consistently." We are also authorized to examine, for the same
purpose, the original statute from which the present law was
first codified in the form it now appears, which is the same as
that in the Code of 1852: Code 1852, §§ 1578, 1579. The
language of that Code is identical with that of all other subsequent Codes of the State down to the one now in force.
The law prior to codification in the present form, as taken
from the Act of 1824, reads as follows: Sec. 4. " Bastards
shall be capable of inheriting, or of transmitting inheritance,
on the part of their mother, in like manner as if they had
been lawfully begotten of such mother; and shall also be
entitled to a distributive share of the personal estate of any
of their kindred on the part of their mother, in like manner
as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother." Sec. 5.
"The kindred of any bastard on the part of his mother shall
be entitled to the distribution of the personal estate of such
bastard, in like manner as if such bastard nad been lawfully
begotten of his mother :" Aiken, St. (2d ed.), 1836, p. 129;
Clay, Dig. Ala. 1843, pp. 168, 169. This old statute differs
in phraseology, but not materially in signification, from the
one now embraced in the Code of 1886, brought forward, as
we have said, from the Code of 1852. It was intended to
remedy the cruel and rigorous policy of the common law in
reference to bastards, by which was visited on these unfortunates a stigma which more properly belonged to their parents,
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and at the same time to deal with the erring mother in a more
liberal spirit of justice as well as of Christian charity. By
that law a bastard was nulliusflius as to the whole question
of inheritance. He had no mother or father, no brothers, sisters, or other kindred, no inheritable blood, and hence no
capacity to inherit or transmit inheritance save to the heirs
of his own body. The supposed origin of this rule has been
asserted to be the discouragement of a promiscuous and illicit
intercourse between the sexes. It is at least debateable
whether precisely the opposite policy, conferring equal rights
of inheritance upon legitimate and illegitimate offspring,
would not better preserve the high moral duty of chastity
between the sexes. This was, to a certain extent, the tendency of the civil and Jewish law, as well as of many other
ancient Codes, now everywhere admitted to be more humane
and enlightened than the rule of the common law on this
subject. The general spirit of modern legislation has accordingly been to sweep away, to a great extent, this unjust and
illiberal policy of the English law, and to not only permit
bastards to inherit from their mothers, but also, in many instances, to provide for their legitimation by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, or by written declaration made for
that purpose and duly recorded, and to authorize them to
transmit inheritance to kindred of their mother's blood, both
collateral and lineal. The laws of Scotland, France, Holland,
and Germany all provide that the intermarriage of' the parents
after the birth of a child shall render such child legitimatea rule of the canoi law, the adoption of which the ecclesiastics urged in vain upon the English parliament in the reign
of Henry III. This has long been the law of Alabama; legitimation following from the intermarriage of the reputed
parents, and recognition by the father: Aiken, St., p. 129,
33; Code 1886, §§ 2364-2869.
This construction as to the heritable rights of bastards and
their collateral kindred was placed upon the Virginia statute
enacted in 1785, and carried into the Code of 1819 of that
State. Our old statute, as appears in Aiken's and Clay's Digests, seems to be copied from the Virginia Code. That law
was construed by the Virginia Court of Appeals, in Garland
VoL. XXXVI.r-
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v. Harrison,8 Leigh, 368 (decided in 1837); an exhaustive
and learned opinion being delivered by three of the five
Judges. They all agreed that the purpose of the statute was
to confer on bastards, not only the capacity to inherit from
their mothers, just as they would do were they legitimate
children, but also the power to transmit inheritance to their
maternal kindred, both collateral and lineal, as if they had
been born in lawful wedlock. The object of the statute, said
Judge PARKER, "was to make bastards quasi legitimate on
the maternal side; to give the bastard a mother and maternal
kindred; and to make them heritable from each other, in the
order prescribed by the law of desbents, as if the bastard had
been lawfully begotten of such mother. It places this line,
in respect to inheritance, precisely in the situation it would
be in if one born in lawful wedlock should die leaving no
parental kindred."

Judlge

BROCKENBROUGH

said: " A bastard

may inherit on the part of his mother, in like manner
as if he were the legitimate son of his mother. He may,
therefore, inherit from his mother, or from his maternal
grandparents, in the direct line, or from his maternal
uncle and aunt, or great-uncles and great-aunts, in the collateral, and a half portion from his legitimate or bastard halfbrother, in the same manner that a legitimate son could
inherit from his legitimate half-brother." Judge TUCKER
construed the statute in like manner, to render a bastard "capable of inheriting from all his kindred on the part of his
mother, whoever they might be." The whole Court vigorously repudiated the soundness of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, in the case of Stevenson's iHeirs v. Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207 (decided in the year 1820), and relied on
for authority in this case by appellant's counsel, in which
that Court had come to a different conclusion in construing
the Virginia statute, holding that it prescribed transmission
of inheritance lineally, but not collaterally, on the part of the
mother of a bastard; in other words, that it conferred on
bastards capacity to inherit by descent immediately or through
their mother in the ascending line, and to transmit the same
to their line of descendants, in like manner as if they were
legitimate, but did not authorize brothers, sisters, or other
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collateral kin even on the mother's side to inherit from
them. The question came before the Virginia Court again
in Hepburn v. Dundas, 13 Grat. 219, (decided in 1856), and
still again, four years later, in Bennett v. Toler, 15 Id. 588 ; and
the case of Garland v. Harrison,8 Leigh, 368, was, after renewed discussion, adhered to and re-affirmed.
The Vermont statute provided that "bastards shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance, on the part of
the mother, as if lawfully begotten of such mother"-the
precise language of section 4 of the Alabama law, as cited
above from Aiken's and Clay's Digests. It was held in Town
of Burlington v. Fosby, 6 Vt. 83 (decided in 1834), that, under
the statutes of descents and distributions, one illegitimate
child could inherit from another illegitimate child of the same
mother, which is the precise question arising in this case.
The Ohio statute is in identical language, and the Supreme
Court of that State, in Lewis v. .Eutsler, 4 Ohio St. 354 (decided in 1854), repudiated the construction placed on the Virginia statute by the United States Supreme Court in Stevenson's -Heirsv. Sullivant, supra, and followed the Vermont
decision, where a like statute, as we have seen, was construed.
They, without a scruple, overruled the case of Little v. Lake,
8 Ohio, 289 (decided in 1838), in which Stevenson v. Sullivant
had been followed. It is observable that in none of these
cases is there any reference made to the case of Garland v.
.Harrison,supra. In Briggs v. Greene, 10 R. I. 495, however,
the authority of the Virginia case is expressly adopted in construing a similar statute in Vermont, and that of the United
States Supreme Court in Stevenson v. Sullivant repudiated. It
was accordingly held, under a statute precisely like the one in
Virginia and the former one in Alabama, that bastard children
of the same mother are capable of transmitting inheritance
on the part of the mother; and when a bastard dies intestate,
leaving a bastard sister by the same mother, her estate will
pass to that sister. Opposed to this view is the case of Bent
v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo. 268 (decided in 1860), which follows the
United States Supreme Court, without noticing the Virginia
decisions; and .Remmington v. Lewis, 8 B. Mon. 606 (decided
in 1848), which omits to notice any of the foregoing cases.
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We adopt the view of the Virginia Court as being more in
accordance with the principles of justice and the enlightened
and liberal policy of modern legislation on this subject: Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501 and note to same, 56 Am. Dec. 263;
Schouler, Dom.Rel. § 381; 2 Kent Com. *208-*214. "Our
law of descents," as said by Judge TUCKER, in Garlandv. Biarrison, supra, "was formed in no small degree upon the human
affections; the legislature very justly conceiving that the
object of a law of descent was to supply the want of a will,
and that it should, therefore, conform in every case, as
nearly as might be, to the probable current of those affections
which would have given direction to the provisions of such
will. Under the influence of these opinions," he adds, " they
legislated in reference to bastards." An English Judge long
ago said, in harmony with the same idea: "The statute of
distributions makes such a will for the intestate as a father,
free from the partiality of affections, would himself make; and
this," he said, "I call a parliamentary will:" -Edwards v.
Freeman, 2 P. Wins. 443. We accordingly hold that, under
our present statute of descents and distributions, the brother of
the deceased intestate bastard by the same mother is entitled
to inherit land of which such intestate dies seised, to the exclusion of the mother. The Chancellor so held; and his decree,
sustaining the demurrers to complainant's bill, is affirmed.
At common law a bastard had no
heritable blood; in consequence, he
was incapable of heirship: Litt. § 188;
Doct. & Student Dial., 1 Ch. 7, and
could have no heirs save those of his
body: Co. Litt. 3 b. This utter disqualification to inherit has been fully
recognized in the United States:
Flintham v. Holder, 1 Dev. Eq. (N. C.)
345; Stover v. Boswell, 3 Dana, 232;
Cooley v. Dewey, 4 Pick. 92; Bent's
Administrator v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo.
2G8 ; Blacklaws v. Milne, 82 Il. 505 ;
probably in all of them, except Connecticut, which at a very early day
declared that the English common
law as to bastards did not prevail
within her boundaries, but by the

common law of Connecticut natural
children of the same mother might be
heirs to each other: Brown v. Dye, 2
Root, 280; this was followed by the
case of Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228,
wherein it was held that a bastard
could inherit from his mother, and
in Dickin6on's Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, a
bastard was recognized as possessing
heritable blood, both lineal and collaferal.
The hardship of the bastard's case
entailed upon him by the sins of his
parents attracted the attention of the
Legislature, and remedies differing,
rather in degree than in kind, have
been enacted in the various States.
It is proposed in this note to consider
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the legislation upon the general subject of inheritance by and from bastards.
As was most natural, the legislation
first took the direction of securing to
the child the right of inheritance from
his mother, and this right is now
recognized in all the States, but the
consequences flowing from that recognition differ according to the terms of
the statutes containing it.
In Florida, Dig. (McClell.) Ch. 92,
§ 8; Indiana, R. S. (181) § 2474;
Kentucky, R. S. (Bul. & Fel. 1881)
Ch. 31, § 5; Missouri, R. S. (1879)
§ 2169 ; Rhode Island, Pub. St. (1882)
Ch. 187, § 7 ; Briggs v. Greene,10 R. I.
495 ; Virginia, Code (1887) §§ 2552,
2553 ; Bennet v. Tolen, 15 Gratt. 588;
Hepburn v. Dundas, 13 Id. 219; Garland v. Harrison, 8 Leigh, 368; West
Virginia, R. S. (1879) Ch. 66, § 5;
it is provided (and formerly was provided in Ohio), that bastards may inherit or transmit inheritance on the
part of their mother as though legitimate. Such statutes do not create
heritable blood generally between the
bastard and his natural collateral
relatives, but limit him to inheritance
in the cases of lineal ascent or descent:
.Allen v. Ramsey's Heirs, 1 Mete. (Ky.)
635 ; Scroggin v. Allan, 2 Dana, 363 ;
Remmington v. Lewis, 8.B. Mon. 606;
Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain, 36 Mo. 268;
and this conclusion has been rested
on the distinction taken between the
expressions ex parte materna and ex
linea materna, it being held that the
former implied lineal descendants:
Little v. Lake, 8 Ohio, 289. This distinction was questioned in Lewis v.
Eutsley, 4 Ohio, St. 354, but was subsequently upheld in Gibson v. McINeeley, 11 Id. 131; and Hawkins v.
Jones, 19 Id. 22. The conclusion is
also supported by a decision of the
Supreme Court of Vermont in Burlington v. Fosby, 6 Vt. 83. That Court

has held, that under the statute of the
State one illegitimate child could inherit from another of the same mother.
In Bacon v. McBride, 32 Id. 585, it
was asked to hold that such child
could inherit from a legitimate child
of the same mother, but REDFIELD, C.
J., said, "This (the expression on
the part of the mother), strictly extends no further than to inheritance
between the mother and child. It
was by construction, in the case of
Burlington v. Fosby, extended to create
the relation of brother and sister between illegitimate children of the
same mother. We are now asked to
extend it so as to create the same relation between illegitimate children
and legitimate children of the same
mother. This is certainly going a
very great way beyond the statute.
It will enable the mother, by illicit
means, to supply at will heirs to the
property of the legitimate children,
who may thus deprive them, in case
of the decease of their brother and
sister, of the enjoyment of the property claimed from their own father.
This is certainly something not contemplated by the Court in the case of
Burlington v. Fosby, and entirely beyond the purview of the statute. In
fact the decision in Burlingtonv. Fosby
went beyond the statute."
In Virginia, the inheritance of the
bastard has been held to be as by a
person of the half blood, a half portion only being taken: Garland v.
Harrison, 8 Leigh, 368; and this was
formerly the case in Mississippi. See
Act Feb. 23, 1846, § 4, p. 231.
In some States the heirship of the
bastard to his mother is recognized,
but he is expressly debarred from the
right of representation, either collateral or lineal: California Civ. Code,
§ 6387; Michigan R. S. (1882)
§ 5773 a; Maine R. S. Ch. 75, § 3;
Minnesota, Gen. L. (1878), Ch. 46, § 5 ;
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Nebraska Comp. St. (1885), Ch. 23,
§ 31; Nevada, Comp. Laws (1873),
§ 795. But such a provision does not
necessarily exclude inheritance between illegitimates of the same
mother. See Estate of .ayee, 63 Cal.
414. The provisions in the other
States are not so readily grasped.
In Alabama, a bastard inherits
fromhis mother: Code (1886), § 1921;
Lingen v. Lingen, 45 Ala. 410.
In Arkansas, he may inherit and
transmit inheritance from and to any
and all collaterals, legitimate or illegitimate: Dig. (1884), § 2524; Gregley v. Jackson, 38 Ark. 487.
In Colorado, the law is the spme as
in Alabama: Colorado R. S. (1883),
1048.
In Georgia, bastards inherit from
their mother irrespective of the existence of legitimate children, and from
each other ; and representation
amongst collaterals will extend to
illegitimates: Code (1882), § 1800.
In Illinois, the common law continued in force until 1845, when an Act
was passed allowing a bastard to inherit from his mother if she remained
unmarried: Rev. Stat. 547, § 53; by
Act of Feb. 12, 1853, Laws, p. 255;
and see Miller v. Villiams, 66 Ill. 91 ;
Blacklaws v. Milne, 82 Id. 505; he
was enabled, in addition, to transmit
his property by inheritance to his
mother and her children. In 1872,
the requirement that the mother
should remain unmarried was swept
away and the illegitimate is now heir
of any person from whom his mother,
if living, could have taken: R. S.
(1883), Ch. 39, Art. 2, § 2. In the
case of Baless v. Elder, 118 Ill. 436,
the facts were as follows: A woman
having an illegitimate son, married
and had legitimate children, the natural child married and died leaving
children; the mother then died and
afterwards one of her legitimate chil-

dren died without leaving issue ; it
was held that the children of the
natural child could inherit as representating their father and his mother.
in Indiana, representation is recognized : R. S. (1881), § 2474.
In Iowa, illegitimates take from
their mother: R. S. § 2441 ; Crane v.
Crane, 31 Iowa, 296; and represent
her: McGuire v. Brown, 41 Id. 650.
In Louisiana, bastards, if acknowledged, succeed to their mother, if
she leave no lawful issue; if she
leave such issue, alimony only is
given totheillegitimates : Cede, § 918 ;
they cannot take by representation
from the legitimate relatives of their
mother: Id. § 921; but may inherit
from each other on proof of common
maternity; Id. § 923; Dupr6 v. Caruthers, 6 La. Ann. 156.
In Maryland, illegitimates of the
same mother take from each other:
Rev. Code (1873), art. 47, § 30.
In Massachusetts, under R. S. Ch.
61, § 2, and Gen. St. Ch. 91, § 5,
while a bastard was declared heir to
his mother, he could not take as her
representative, either from her lineal
or collateral relatives: Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40; Kent v. Barker, 2
Gray, 535; Curtis v. Hewens, 11 Mete.
294 ; but now it is provided by Pub.
Stat. (1882) Ch. 125, § 3, that an illegitimate child shall be heir of his
motherand of any natural ancestor,and
that the lawful issue of an illegitimate
shall represent him. This Act gives lineal representation, but does not render
the bastard his mother's representaive as to collateral inheritance: Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430.
In New Hampshire, the law is the
same as in Alabama and Colorado:
Gen. St. (1878) Ch. 203, §§ 4, 5.
In New York, in default of legitimate children, bastards are declared
heirs to their mother as if legitimate:
R. S., p. 2214; Act 1885, Ch. 547.
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The same rule prevails in New Jersey:
Stew. Dig. Orphans' Ct., pl. 147 (p.
785).
In North Carolina, by the Act of
1799, bastards were given the right of
inheritance from their mother where
she had no lawful issue: &awyer v.
&wyer, 6 Ired. L. 407; illegitimates
of the same mother were allowed to
take from each other and legitimates might take with them as coheirs, but the bastard could not inherit from the legitimate children:
Den on den. Ehringhaus v. Cartwright,
8 Id. 39 ; this rule was modified under
Bat. Rev. Ch. 36, rule 11, only so far
as to permit a representation of brothers and sisters: McBryde v. Patterson,
78 N. C. 412; Powers v. Kite, 83 Id.
156 ; and the law governing realty is
still the same: Code (1883), § 1281,
Rules 9, 10; as to personalty, however, the bastard will take with the
legitimate children of the same mother
share and share alike: Code, § 1486.
In Mississippi, bastards inherit
from their mother and brother's children, and her kindred and their children and descendants from brothers
and sisters of their fatherand mother,
whether legitimate or illegitimate,
and from their grandparents, but not
from any ancestor or collateral kindred, if there be legitimate heirs in
the same degree: Rev. Code (1880),
§ 1275.
In Ohio, bastards inherit from and
represent their mothers: R. L. (1884)
§ 4174.
In Pennsylvania, under the Act of
April 27, 1855, § 3, P. L. 368, which
provides that illegitimates and their
mother "shall respectively have capacity to take or inherit from each
other personal estate as next of kin,
and real estate as heirs in fee simple,
and as respects said real or personal
estate, to transmi the same according
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to the laws of this State," illegitimates
shall share equally with legitimates in
the estate of their common mother: Opdyke's Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 373, but are
not legitimated: Grubb's Appeal, 58
Id. 55. The Act is not retrospective
and does not enable a bastard dying
before his mother, to transmit a right
from her to his descendants: Stecel's
Appeal, 64 Id. 493. The Act of June
5, 1883, P. L. 88, provides that "illegitimate children born of the same
mother shall have capacity to take
from each other personal property as
next of kin, anfl real estate as heirs
in fee simple in the same manner as
children born in lawful wedlock."
This Act does not seem to have been
interpreted by the Supreme Court. In
Herbein's Estate, 2 Chest. Co. Rep.
449, the Orphans' Court held that it
did not confer upon the issue of a
deceased illegitimate the right to fake
as his representative from his brothers
and sisters.
In Tennessee, bastards were by the
Act of 1819, ch. 13, § 1, empowered to
inherit from their mother where there
were no legitimate children, but their
right was strictly limited to the terms
of the Act: Brown v. Kerby, 9 Humph.
461; the right was afterwards so extended as to allow illegitimate brothers and sisters to inherit from each
other: Act of 1851, Ch. 39 ; and this
right was extended to legitimate children of the same mother: Riley v.
Byrd, 3 Head, 20; Webb v. Webb, Id.
68; but under the Act, while legitimate children could inherit from illegitimates of the same mother, the illegitimates could not inherit from the
legitimates: Woodward v. Duncan, 1
Coldw. 563. This inequality was remedied by an Act passed in 1866-67;
see Code (M. & V. 1884), § 3274;
Scoggins v. Barnes, 8 Baxt. 560.
In Texas, a bastard may inherit
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from and through his mother, and
transmit the inheritance: R. S. (1S79)
Tit. 33, § 1657.

The legislatures have been much
more chary with regard to permitting
a bastard to inherit from his father
than they have been with regard to a
maternal inheritance, and for reasons
which seem well founded in public
policy. In some States, however, a
fairly liberal policy in this respect
has prevailed.
In California, a bastard becomes
heir of the person who by a writing,
in presence of a witness, declares that
he is his father: Civil Code, § 6587;
but the writing must be one executed
for the express purpose of changing the
status of the child: Pina v. Peck, 31
Cal. 359 ; Fstate of Sandford, 4 Id. 12.
In Iowa, R. S. (1884) § 2466, and
Kansas, Comp. St. (1885) § 2261, a
bastard acknowledged by his father,
or whose paternity is proved in his
father's lifetime, may take as his heir.
The acknowledgment must be in writing, or notorious, but if in writing it
need not be, as in California, formal,
anl it has been held that a sufficient
acknowledgment may be found in a
series of letters written by a father to
and about his natural son at school :
Crane v. Crane, 31 Iowa, 296. The
acknowledginent does not legitimatize
the child : Brou v. Behnarde, 3
Kan. 41.
In Indiana, an illegitimate child
who has been acknowledged, will take
as heir of his father, who dies without legitimate heirs resident in the
United States, or legitimate children,
irrespective of residence: R. S. (1881)
§ 2475. In the fact of acknowledgment the testimony of the mother
must be excluded: Id. ; and the word
"heirs" in the statute is not confined
to lineal heirs, but embraces collaterals, so that brothers and sisters resident in the United States will exclude

the illegitimate child of the decedent:
Borroughs v. Adams, 78 Ind. 160.
In Louisiana, an acknowledged bastard may take from his father who
leaves no descendants, ascendants, or
collateral relatives : Code, § 918, or a
widow, § 924 ; but the bastard obtains
no right of representation by the
acknowledgment: § 921; and an unacknowledged bastard cannot take,
although his paternity may have been
judicially ascertained: Dupre v. Caruthers, 6 La. Ann. 186.
In some States, the subsequent marriage of the parents of a bastard has
been allowed to confer an heritable
qualityupon the ante-nuptial progeny.
It is well known that by the Roman
law the marriage of the parents rendered such offspring legitimate, and
that it was to a proposition to introduce
the same rule into the English law in
thereign of Henry III., that the famous
answer, " Nolu m us quod nolint leges Anglim mutari, quwe hucusque usitatce sunt et
approbatce," was given; although more
attention to abstract justice and a little less exaggeration of national pride
might well have dictated another answer ; still, in this country, following
in the footsteps of the example set in
England, the policy of refusing legitimation to the child on subsequent
marriage prevailed for a very lcug
time, indeed until very recently. The
example of breaking away from the
hard English rule seems to have been
set by Virginia, whose legislation
about the time of and subsequent to
the Revolution showed, by its decided
tendency in the direction of justice
and freedom, the influence of thosegreat men, profound jurists and statesmen, who then led her, and who in
1785 passed an Act rendering legitimate ante-nuptial children. At present, in the following States the subsequent marriage of Aile parents of a
bastard and his recognition by them,
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renders him legitimate: Alabama,
Code (1876) § 2742; Arkansas, Dig.
(1884) § 2525 ; California, Civil Code.
§ 6387; Georgia, Code (1882) § 1786;
Illinois, R. S. (1883) Ch. 39, § 3; Indiana, R. S. (1881) § 2476 ; Kentucky,
Gen. Stat. (1881) Ch. 31, § 6; Maryland, R. C. (1878) Art. 47, § 29;
Massachusetts, Pub. St. (1882) Ch.
125, § 5 ; Michigan, Rev. Stat. (1882)
§ 5775, a; Mississippi, R. C. (1880)
§ 1275 ; Missouri, R. S. (1879) § 2170 ;
New Hampshire, Gen. L. (1878) Ch.
181, § 15 ; Ohio, R. S. (1884) § 4175 ;
Oregon, Gen. L. (1872) Miscell. Ch.
10, Tit. 3, § 5; Pennsylvania, Act
May 14, 1857, § 1, P. L. 507 ; Texas,
R. S. (1879) Art. 1656 ; Vermont,
Rev. L. (1880) § 2233; Virginia,
Code (1887) § 2553; West Virginia,
R. S. (1879) Ch. 66, § 6.
To cause legitimation there must be
recognition as well as marriage; in
Michigan, however, marriage only is
mentioned in the Act, so that there,
perhaps, proof of parentage other than
by recognition may be sufficient.
It is not necessary that the process
of legitimation be complete in the lifetime of the legitimatized person; it
may be completed after his death, provided no vested rights are impaired
thereby. This position is illustrated
by the case of Ash v. Way's Administrator, 2 Gratt. 203. In that case, R.
Way was the father of an illegitimate
child, Mary Ann, whom in his lifetime and at his death he recognized as
his own; Mary Ann married Ash and
died, leaving a son ; after Mary Ann's
death, Way married her mother. On
the death of Way, the son of Mary
Ann claimed to be his legitimate descendant, and a demurrer to his claim
was overruled. Acts of the character
of those above enumerated maybe retrospective and retroactive. The Virginia Act was passed in 1785, an illegitimate child born in 1775, and
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acknowledged in 1776, was held legitimate within its provisions in Sleigh
v. Strider, 5 Cal. 439. In Stevenson v.
Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207, the Supreme
Court of the United States, on the authority of a dictum of ROANE, J.,
in Rice v. Efford, 3 H. & M. 228,
held. the Act not retroactive, but
Stevenson v. Sullivant was denied by
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in
Garland v. Harrison, 8 Leigh, 368.
The retroaction may render legitimate
the issue of a deceased person: Gregley v. Jackson, 38 Ark. 487, and legitimation itself cannot operate to divest
vested rights, as for example, to cause
a redistribution of property which has
already descended to legitimate children: Killam v. Killam, 39 Pa. St.
120 ; McGunnigle v. MlcKee, 77 Id. 81 ;
or to deprive the State of a vested
right to the collateral inheritance tax :
Galbraithv. Commonoealth, 14 Pa. St.
258.
In some States, there are statutory
provisions for legitimation upon application by the father to the proper
Court; Georgia, Code (1882) § 1787;
North Carolina, Code (1883) Ch. 5,
§ 39 ; Tennessee, Code (1884) §§ 438187; Mississippi, Code, § 1496 ; in
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia there is a requirement that the
father must have been unmarried at
the time of the child's birth. Legitimation may be by acknowledgment in
writing,'in Alabama, Code § 2365, and
Michigan, Rev. Stat. (1882) § 5775 a.
Western States have not gone to
the length of declaring a bastard
legitimate upon the subsequent marriage of his parents, but have provided for his inheritance in such a
contingency; thus, in Colorado, R. S.
(1883) § 1045; Maine, R. S. (1883)
Ch. 75, § 3, as to children born after
March 24, 1864; in Minnesota, Gen.
Laws (1878) Ch. 47, § 5; Nebraska,
R. S. Ch. 23, § 31; Nevada, R. S.
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§ 795; Wisconsin, R. S. § 2274; there
is the additional requirements that
the parents shall not only marry but
have other children before the death
of the bastard, and this seems to be
the rule with reference to children
born before March 24, 1864, in Maine.
These statutes, while they do not
technically legitimatize the child,
seem to confer all the privileges of a
legitimate heir, including representation; but in Nevada, Laws, 1885, Ch.
24, § 9, and California, Civil Code,
§ 5230, there may be a species of legitimation by matter in pais, when the
father of an illegitimate publicly acknowledges the child as his own and
receives it into his family, with the
assent of his wife, if he be married,
and otherwise treat it as a legitimate.
In certain States, the issue of a
marriage deemed null in law is held
legitimate. Arkansas, Dig. § 2526;
Missouri, R. S. § 2171; Nebraska,
Comp. St. Ch. 23, § 31; Nevada, R.
S. § 795 ; Ohio, R. S. § 4175; Texas,
R. S. Art. 1656; Virginia, Code (1887)
§ 2553; West Virginia, R. S. Ch. 66,
§ 7; Wisconsin, R. S. § 2274.
In Ohio, an attempt was made to
confine the words of the statute
"deemed null in law," to voidable
marriages, but the Court before which
the question came refused to adopt
such restricted interpretation, and
held that the issue of a marriage contracted by a man who had a wife
still living was legitimate within the
terms of the statute. 1Vright v. Lore,
12 Ohio St. 619, and see Stones v.
Keeling, 5 Cal. 143. In Missouri the
effect of the statute has been held to
allow a guilty father to inherit from
his child: Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo.
391.
In California, the statutory provision referred to is, that the issue of
any marriage, annulled on the ground
that a former husband or wife was

living, or of insanity, begotten before
judgment, is legitimate: Civ. Code,
§ 5084; and in Louisiana there is a
provision for the legitimation of the
offspring of null marriages, but it appears to be confined to cases wherein
the parties or one of them has acted
in good faith, as where a woman
marries ignorantly an already married
man: Code, Arts. 119, 120; Abston v.
Abston, 15 La. Ann. 137.
The inheritance by the parents of
bastards has also been the subject of
legislation, and in all the States the
mother may now take by inheritance
from her illegitimate child. In Georgia Code, § 1800: Illinois R. S. Ch.
39, § 2; Nevada, R. S. § 796; Oregon, Gen. Laws, Miscell. Ch. 10, § 5,
she is postponed to the widow or surviving husband of the illegitimate ;
in 'Maine, she shares with the widow
or husband: R. S. Ch. 75, § 4; in
Louisiana, she takes to the exclusion
of brothers and sisters : Code, § 922;
Nolasco v. Lurty, 13 La. Ann. 100;
in Colorado, R. S. § 1048, and Illinois
and Georgia, supra, she shares with
them, taking as her part one-half of
the inheritance ; in the other States
the mother of a bastard and her
kindred inherit from him as the
mother and kindred of a legitimate
child would from him so far as the
mother's side is concerned; Alabama,
Code, § 1922; Arkansas, Dig. § 2524;
California, Civil Code, § 6388; Delaware, 2 Laws, Ch. 243; Florida, McClell. Dig. Ch. 92, § 8 ; Indiana, R.
S. § 2477 ; Iowa, R. S. § 2465 ; Kansas,
Comp. St. Ch. 33, § 22; Kentucky,
Gen. St. Ch. 31, § 5 ; Maryland, R.
C. Ch. 47, § 30; Massachusetts, Pub.
St. Ch. 125, § 4; Michigan, Rev. St.
§ 5774 a; Minnesota, Gen. Laws, Oh.
46, § 6 ; Missouri, R. S. § 2169; Nebraska, R. S. Ch. 23, § 32; New Hampshire, R. S. Ch. 203, § 4; New York,
R. S. Pt. 2, Ch. 2, § 14; New Jersey,
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R. S. (Stewart), p. 1299, pl. 1; North
Carolina, Code, § 1281; Ohio, R. S.
§ 4174; Oregon, R. S. Ch. 10, § 5;
Pennsylvania, Purd. Dig. (1872), p.
934, pl. 40; Rhode Island, Pub. St.
Ch. 187, § 7; Tennessee, Stat. 1885,
Ch. 34; Texas, R. S. § 1657; Vermont, R. S. § 2232; Virginia, Code,
§ 2552; West Virginia, Act 1882, Ch.
94, § 5 ; Wisconsin, R. S. § 2273.
Inheritance by the father of the
bastard appears to be permitted in but
few States. In Kansas and Iowa, the
father of an acknowledged bastard,

where the acknowledgment is mutual, may take from him; in the
latter State, he will, under such circumstances, have the same rights of
heirship as the mother of the illegitimate, R. S. Iowa, § 2467: but in
Kansas, he will be postponed to the
mother and her issue: Dig. § 2262;
in Louisiana, the father who has acknowledged a bastard may inherit
from him, and if both the mother and
father have acknowledged him, they
will share equally in his estate:
HENRY Bunn.
Code, § 922.

Supreme Court of the United States.
ASHER v. STATE OF TEXAS.
The Texas Act, May 4, 1882, imposing a tax on every commercial traveller,
drummer, salesman, or solicitor of trade by sample or otherwise, is repugnant
to the constitutional power of Congress (to regulate commerce among the several States), and is void.
It is strenuously contended by the Court of Appeals of Texas, in this case,
that the decision of this Court, in Robbins v. Taxing District, is contrary to
sound principles of constitutional construction; as to the constitutional principles involved, the views of this Court are quite fully and carefully expressed
in the Robbins case.
Local burdens imposed upon interstate commerce, by way of taxing an
occupation directly concerned therein, as by levying a general license tax on
telegraph companies, are unconstitutional.
When a decision of this Court is not in harmony with previous decisions,
it has the effect of overruling such prior ones as it is in conflict with, whether
mentioned and commented on, or not.
Exparte Asher, ante, p. 77, reversed, and Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U.
S. 489, and Leloup v. Mobile, 127 Id. 640, affirmed.
Opinion by BRADLEY, J., October 29, 1888, in full in 128 U. S. 000.

